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Abstract. A criterion is presented to prove atomicity of read-write ob-
jects by means of ghost variables and invariants. The criterion is applied
to Bloom’s construction of a two-writer atomic register from two one-writer
atomic registers and to the algorithm of Vitanyi and Awerbuch for the con-
struction of a read-write object with m readers and writers, based on m2
read-write objects for one reader and one writer. In both cases, the proof
comes down to the veriﬁcation of a number of invariants. The hand-written
proofs of these invariants have been veriﬁed with a mechanical theorem
prover.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a criterion for atomicity of read-write objects by
means of ghost variables and invariants. Since preservation of a given invari-
ant in a given algorithm is relatively easy to verify or falsify, the criterion
makes rigorous, even mechanical, veriﬁcation easier. The criterion provides
guidance to the designer since it introduces the ghost variables with required
invariants. It is up to the designer to encode the ghost variables in such a way
that the invariants can be preserved. The criterion also reduces the possibil-
ity of errors in hand-written proofs: the proof breaks into inevitable cases,
and forces one to reason about actions rather than execution traces.
1.1 Atomicity and blocking
Concurrency is introduced for efﬁcient utilization of processing capability.
It may lead, however, to undesirable interferences, e.g., when two processes
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concurrently need exclusive access to some resource. This is the mutual
exclusion problem of [7], in which blocking of processes is unavoidable.
There are cases, however, where undesirable interferences can be avoided
without blocking.When available, such solutions are usually preferred since
blocking has always a performance penalty and introduces the danger of
deadlock.
Nonblocking methods to avoid undesirable interferences are more difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd and to argue about. Indeed, what are “undesirable interferences”
and what is the meaning of “nonblocking”? Instead of a negative goal as
the avoidance of undesirable interferences, we need a positive goal. This
positive goal was ﬁrst deﬁned in 1979 as serializability [22] or sequential
consistency [17]. Later reﬁnements of the theory [12, 20] introduced the
terms of linearizability and atomicity.
The term “nonblocking” can also be interpreted in many ways. It is
related to fairness (e.g. see [9]). In this paper, we interpret “nonblocking” as
wait-free [11]. Informally speaking, a concurrent system is wait-free when
every process can achieve its current goal in a bounded number of steps,
independently of the (in)activity of other processes.
When we know what we mean by atomicity (linearizability) and non-
blocking, the problem becomes to give nonblocking implementations of
atomic objects of various types. Now the problem of correctness arises. In-
deed, since incorrect solutions of concurrency problems do appear in the
literature, the solutions must be veriﬁed and must be veriﬁable for others.
1.2 Veriﬁcation: assertions or behaviours
There are two methods for the veriﬁcation of concurrent algorithms. One
method, the assertional approach, is to rely on invariants and variant func-
tions, cf. [21]. The alternative, the behavioural approach, is to argue about
execution sequences where certain actions precede other actions, cf. [18].
In [15], we introduced the terms synchrony and diachrony to distinguish
these approaches.
The behavioural approach is closer to operational intuition and, often,
also to the requirements that we want to satisfy. The assertional approach
is more convenient for formal, possibly mechanical, veriﬁcation. The two
approaches do not mix conveniently, but they are complementary and, for
every nontrivial algorithm, we need the right combination of them.
Indeed, the operational intuition often suggests that certain actions are
needed to establish certain properties. The operational intuition is unreli-
able, however, when it comes to excluding undesirable interferences. For-
mal treatment based on execution sequences can be quite elegant, cf. [19],
but it always requires analysis of all possible execution sequences and offers
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no structure to exclude some of these. For the latter purpose, we often need
invariants but then we are back at the assertional approach. An assertional
design method for concurrent algorithms is presented in [8].
In our view, the designer may use all kinds of intuition to come to a
reasonable design or design step. Formal speciﬁcation, analysis and proof in
assertional terms can then be used to give the indispensable complementary
evidence of correctness. We therefore aim at an assertional criterion for
atomicity.
1.3 Grain of atomicity
Every formal veriﬁcation is based on a mathematical model. In the case
of concurrent algorithms where computations of different processes are in-
terleaved nondeterministically, the most critical modelling assumptions are
about the grain of atomicity, i.e., the sizes of the chunks that are guaranteed
to remain together in all interleavings. It may be easy to prove the correct-
ness of an algorithm under assumption of a coarse grain of atomicity, but
this can impose too severe restrictions on the implementation. A ﬁne grain
of atomicity is easier to implement, but it may make it harder to prove the
correctness of the algorithm.
The solution is to apply hierarchy: use ﬁne grain atomicity to implement
atomic commands of a coarser grain of atomicity. In other words, composite
commands are accepted as atomic when they are behaviourally equivalent
to atomic commands. This idea was proposed in [17, 22] under the names
of sequential consistency and serializability. In [12], the formalization was
sharpened to linearizability, which is a property of the accessed data objects.
Lynch [20] introduces the term atomic for linearizability since there is no
observable difference.
When constructing an atomic data object with a given speciﬁcation, two
ingredients must be combined: a sequential implementation of the required
functional behaviour and a set of primitive atomic data objects to control the
concurrency. The papers [11,13], e.g., describe implementations of an arbi-
trary atomic data object, given a sequential implementation of its functional
behaviour, and using as primitives read-write registers, consensus registers
and a compare and swap register. In the present paper, we restrict ourselves
to the construction of atomic read-write registers and we only use read-write
registers with bounds on the numbers of readers and writers.
1.4 The applications
This investigation was triggered by Groote’s remark in [10] that he did not
know an elegant way to prove the correctness of Bloom’s construction of
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a two-writer atomic register from two one-writer atomic registers. Indeed,
Bloom’s original proof in [3] is complicated, as well as behavioural. After
some analysis, we constructed a simpler and assertional proof.
Inspired by the proof of Bloom’s algorithm in [20] Sect. 13.4.4, which
is behavioural, we here present a general assertional atomicity criterion for
read-write objects. This criterion is then used to proveBloom’s algorithm [3]
and the algorithm of Vitanyi–Awerbuch [24]. In both cases, a comparison
with the behavioural proofs in Lynch’s book [20] is in order. Our assertional
proofs remain closer to the actual code and require veriﬁcations that aremore
easily formalized for a mechanical theorem prover. The behavioural proofs
of [20] are more abstract, more conceptual, and better suited to interest and
convince a human audience.
Bloom’s algorithm is the construction of a two-writer atomic register
for an arbitrary number of readers from two one-writer atomic registers, by
means of one additional bit to express recentness. The algorithm of Vitanyi
and Awerbuch is an implementation of a read-write atomic object with m
ports that can both read and write, given m2 registers, each for a single
writer and a single reader. It needs unbounded integers for the reading ports
to choose the most recent value.
1.5 Mechanical veriﬁcation
In mathematics, handwritten proofs have served well for ages. Why then do
we need mechanical theorem proving for concurrency? In our view, the rea-
son is that, broadly speaking, in concurrency the combinatorial complexity
is higher than in mathematics, although the conceptual complexity is lower.
Even short code fragments may require dull case distinctions that must be
handled carefully but can be dealt with effectively by a machine.
In concurrency, handwritten proofs have also the drawback that, when
the program is modiﬁed only marginally, the whole proof is in jeopardy.
This is not the case with mechanical proofs. If the old proof is applied to
the new program, the prover automatically indicates where the old proof
needs modiﬁcation. It is our experience that, when the modiﬁcation of the
program is correct and not too big, a moderate modiﬁcation of the proof
may be sufﬁcient.
After our work in [13–15], we now have a prelude [16] that deﬁnes
the semantics of concurrency with shared variables in less than 120 lines
for the theorem prover NQTHM of [4, 5]. This prelude can be used only for
the assertional approach. Indeed, it mainly deﬁnes a function that, given a
concurrent program and a list of shared variables, determines the possible
atomic steps, i.e., how the global state is modiﬁed when any of the processes
executes a single atomic command. For a speciﬁc program, we then let the
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prover verify a number of lemmas that specify how each variable is modiﬁed
by an atomic command. After this, we use the prover to analyse whether
proposed invariants are preserved. As shown in [14], progress can also be
veriﬁed.
In this system, we model nondeterminacy in the following way. We use
an auxiliary private variable oracle, which is a pair. Every nondeterministic
choice is based on the ﬁrst component of oracle. After each inspection,
oracle is updated by means of the undeﬁned function. The value of oracle is
not allowed in the invariants. Since the second component of oracle remains
hidden, arbitrary choice sequences can be generated in thisway. Since oracle
is a private variable, its usage can be combined atomically with actions on
shared variables.
A side-effect of our work with NQTHM on concurrency proofs is that it
has taught us sharper modes of reasoning about invariants.
1.6 Overview
In Sect. 2, we deﬁne atomicity of concurrent data objects, specialize to read-
write objects, and then present and prove our criterion for atomicity of the
latter, followed by a brief comparison with Lynch’s atomicity criterion.
In Sect. 3, we describe Bloom’s algorithm, transform it so as to apply our
atomicity criterion, prove the atomicity criterion by means of a number of
invariants, and give an indication how this proof is supplied to the theorem
prover.
Section 4 contains the treatment of the algorithm of Vitanyi and Awer-
buch along the same lines. This algorithm is a more straightforward illus-
tration of the criterion, in the sense that its treatment requires less creativity.
Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Atomicity of concurrent objects
A concurrent data object is an automaton that holds a value, which can be
accessed and modiﬁed via a number of ports. Atomicity of an object means
that the object regarded as a black box cannot be distinguished froman object
in which the operations take place instantaneously, even though invocations
and responses may require some time. It follows that the implementer of
an atomic object has two responsibilities: correct functional behaviour and
atomicity.
In this paper, we treat atomicity of read-write objects. A read-write object
is an object that only allows the value to be read or to be replaced by an-
other value. Since we like to treat actual protocols by means of assertional
reasoning, we present an assertional criterion for atomicity of read-write
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objects and we apply it to two of the examples in [20]. We shall prove the
validity of our criterion by relating it to the formal deﬁnition of atomicity.
We therefore start with the formal deﬁnitions of concurrent data objects and
their atomicity. We use a terminology close to those of [12, 13, 20].
2.1 General deﬁnitions
A variable type T is a tuple T = 〈V, Inv,Res, v0, f〉 where V , Inv and Res
are sets, v0 is an element of V , and f is a function f : V × Inv→ V × Res.
An object of type T is an automaton that holds a current value v ∈ V , which
initially equals v0. The set Inv holds the possible invocations of objects of
type T , the set Res is the set of responses. The effects of the invocations on
the current value and the responses are determined by the transition function
f in the following way. If an object of type T holds current value v ∈ V
and is invoked by u ∈ Inv, it gets a new value w ∈ V and responds with
r ∈ Res, as determined by f(v, u) = (w, r).
The object is called concurrent if it can be accessed concurrently over
a ﬁnite number of ports in such a way that an invocation over some port is
eventually answered by a response over the same port. The port cannot be
used for a new invocation before this response has come.
The observable behaviour of the object is determined by its set of execu-
tions. Executions are deﬁned in the following way. Let us deﬁne communi-
cation to mean invocation or response. An execution of the object is a ﬁnite
or inﬁnite sequence e of pairs (q, u) with ports q and communications u.
An execution e is well-formed iff, for every port q, the subsequence of e of
the pairs with ﬁrst component q alternates between invocation and response
and starts with an invocation. The last invocation of q need not (yet) have a
corresponding response.
Since invocations and responses over different ports may interleave, we
have to specify the relation between invocations and responses carefully.
The concurrent object is called atomic iff all its executions are legal, where,
informally speaking, an execution is legal if its responses can be justiﬁed by
postulating interleaved transitions of the object. Each transition must take
place atomically at some moment between invocation and response. This is
formalized as follows.
An operation is a triple 〈u,w, r〉 where u is an invocation, w is a value,
and r is a response. We regard w and r as the new value and response
resulting from invocation u. A history is a sequence of pairs (q, z) where
each q is a port and each z is a communication or an operation.
If h is a history and p is a port, the local history hp is the subsequence
of h of the pairs with ﬁrst component p, from which the (now redundant)
ﬁrst components p have been removed. A local history hp is well-formed iff
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every response r in it is immediately preceded by some operation 〈u,w, r〉
and every operation 〈u,w, r〉 in it is immediately preceded by the invocation
u and every invocation (except for the very ﬁrst invocation) is immediately
preceded by some response. So, the last invocation of p need not (yet) have
a corresponding operation and the last operation of p need not (yet) have a
corresponding response. A history h is well-formed iff its local histories hq,
for all ports q, are well-formed.
A history h ﬁts an execution e iff e is obtained from h by removing all
pairs (q, z)where z is an operation. Informally speaking, the operations can
be removed since they are not observable, but they have to take place at
some moment between invocation and response.
It remains to express that the object respects its speciﬁcation as given by
transition function f . For this purpose, we deﬁne the operation history h′
of h to be the sequence of subsequent operations of history h; this sequence
is obtained by ﬁrst removing from h all pairs (q, u) with communications
u, and then removing the port components. An operation history h′ with
elements 〈ui, wi, ri〉 where i ranges over 0 ≤ i < m, is deﬁned to be legal
iff f(wi−1, ui) = (wi, ri) for all i, where w−1 = v0 by convention.
A history h is deﬁned to be legal iff its operation history h′ is legal.
An execution e is deﬁned to be legal iff there exists a well-formed legal
history h that ﬁts it. A concurrent data object is deﬁned to be atomic iff it is
guaranteed that every occurring execution of it is legal.
Example. Assume each of the ports q0, q1, q2, q3 submits one invoca-
tion. The invocation of q1 is treated before the invocation of q0, but only
q0 receives the response. The execution e has the form: (q0, u0), (q1, u1),
(q2, u2), (q3, u3), (q0, r1). The historyh canhave the form: (q0, u0), (q1, u1),
(q1, 〈u1, w0, r0〉), (q2, u2), (q0, 〈u0, w1, r1〉), (q3, u3), (q0, r1). The corre-
sponding operation history h′ is 〈u1, w0, r0〉, 〈u0, w1, r1〉. The histories h
and h′ are legal iff f(v0, u1) = (w0, r0) and f(w0, u0) = (w1, r1). The
local history hq1 of port q1 is u1, 〈u1, w0, r0〉.
Summarizing, the object is atomic iff all its executions are legal. An
execution is legal iff it canbemergedwith a legal operationhistory, decorated
with port names, to a well-formed history.
The deﬁnition of atomicity in [20] uses serialization points instead of
pairs (q, z) where z is an operation, as above. It is equivalent to the present
one since the values of q and z can be reconstructed from the other infor-
mation. The deﬁnitions of linearizability in [12, 13] differ in other aspects,
but are also equivalent.
Remark. An execution is called sequential iff it is well-formed and every
invocation in it is immediately followed by the corresponding response,
possibly except for the very last invocation. A concurrent object is called
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sequentially correct iff every sequential execution of it is legal. Sequential
correctness is much weaker than atomicity, but it is also useful. An object
that is merely sequentially correct, can be used by concurrent processes
under mutual exclusion.
2.2 Atomic read-write objects
We now restrict our attention to a read-write variable type for values of type
V . For such a type, we have only write commands and read commands.
We model the write command v := x by means of an invocation (Write, x)
with the response Ack. We model a read command of the value v by means
of an invocation Read answered by v. We now have that the set Inv of
invocations is the disjoint union ({Write} × V ) ∪ {Read} and the set Res
of responses is {Ack} ∪ V . The transitions are speciﬁed by function f with
f(v, (Write, x)) = (x,Ack) and f(v,Read) = (v, v).
We turn to the question of proving atomicity for a concurrent read-write
object, i.e., a concurrent object of a read-write variable type. In view of our
preference for the assertional approach, we aim at a criterion in terms of
states and invariants. Since the state often holds not enough information, we
extend the state with additional variables that play no role in the algorithm
but only serve in the proof. Such variables are called ghost variables [6],
auxiliary variables [21] or history variables [1]. We prefer the ﬁrst term,
since “auxiliary” often has a general connotation and “history” suggests a
speciﬁc role. Since ghost variables are conceptual only, arbitrary atomic
commands can be extended with actions on ghost variables without danger
to the atomicity.
We regard a port as a process or thread that executes the operations it
participates in. The invocation of an operation takes place when the port
starts the execution. The response coincides with the termination of the
operation. The ports communicate via shared variables. They may also have
some private variables. We use the general convention that shared variables
are in type writer font and private variables are slanted. In predicates over
the total state, we write x.p for the value of private variable x of port p. Like
ordinary variables, ghost variables can be shared or private.
We now give an assertional criterion for atomicity of a concurrent read-
write object. The idea is to prove the atomicity (or linearizability) of the
object by extending its implementation with actions on ghost variables in
such a way that the order of the operations is sufﬁciently determined.
Setting. In order to prove atomicity, we provide every port with private
integer ghost variables start and sqn (sequence number). We use masq to
denote themaximal number sqnof the completed operations.More precisely,
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masq is a shared ghost variable with an arbitrary initial value t0. Every port
updates masq at the end of every operation by
masq := max(sqn,masq) .
In every operation of a port, it updates its private variables start and sqn
precisely once as described now. Every operation of a port starts by copying
the current value of masq to start.
We assume that during every write operation, before the actual writing,
the writing port determines some number for sqn and attaches this number
as a kind of time stamp to the value to be written. In order to express that
writers always choose different numbers for sqn, we introduce a shared ghost
variable snlist of the type list of integers with snlist = [t0] initially.
Whenever a writer chooses a number for sqn, it appends this number to
snlist. The freedom of writers in their choices of sqnwill only be limited
by the conditions in Theorem CRIT below.
Every port that copies a value, also copies the number attached. When
a reading port interprets a value as the value read, it copies the attached
number to its private variable sqn. The initial value v0 of the implemented
object is tagged with the initial number t0. Since the connection between
values and attached numbers is preserved by copying, we have that, when a
port encounters a value (x, t), then (x, t) = (v0, t0) or there is a writer that
has written (x, t).
Theorem CRIT. Assume that every write action of a port p has the post-
condition start.p < sqn.p and that every read action of a port p has the
postcondition start.p ≤ sqn.p. Assume that snlist always remains with-
out multiple occurrences. Then the object is atomic.
Proof. An object is atomic iff all its executions are legal. We therefore
consider an arbitrary execution of the object, i.e., a sequence of invocations
and responses resulting from the actions of a number of ports on the object.
We have to prove that this execution is legal. The execution is well-formed
since each port can execute at most one operation at a time: it needs to wait
for a response before it can invoke again.
In order to prove that the execution is legal, we have to form a ﬁtting
legal history. We shall use the order of the numbers masq and sqn for this
purpose. We ﬁrst tag all communications with a number. Every invocation
is tagged with the value of masq that is assigned to start at the moment
of the invocation. Every response is tagged with the value of masq written
at the end of the operation. Since masq is incremented only, the tags are
ascending (i.e., non-decreasing) along the execution.
We now have to determine the operations and to form a ﬁtting history by
placing the operations in the execution. We ﬁrst determine which operations
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to add, and tag these operations for adequate positioning later on. For every
writing invocation, we add an operation to the history, even if the execu-
tion does not contain the corresponding response. For a reading invocation
we only add an operation to the history when the execution contains the
response.
For every writing invocation u = (Write, x) of a port q, we introduce
an operation ω = 〈u, x,Ack〉 and we tag the pair (q, ω) with the number
sqn chosen by writer q. For every reading response v with attached number
t, say by port q, we introduce the operation ω = 〈Read, v, v〉 and we tag
the pair (q, ω) with the tag t. This determines the operations that have to be
added to get a history. It remains to determine the order.
We ﬁrst insert all reading operations into the execution in such a way that
the attached numbers remain ascending and that every reading operation is
placed between the corresponding invocation and response. This is possible
because of the assumption start.p ≤ sqn.p and the ﬁnal updates of masq.
We then insert all writing operations, in such a way that the attached time
stamps remain ascending and that every write operation precedes all other
operations tagged with the same number. This is possible since snlist
never has multiple occurrences and, hence, different write operations have
different tags. Since a writer always chooses sqn > start, the operation
comes after the invocation. It comes before the response because of the ﬁnal
update of masq. This implies that the resulting history is well-formed. The
history ﬁts the execution by construction.
The resulting history is legal because of the assumption that, whenever
a reader reads (x, t), then (x, t) = (v0, t0) or there is a writer that has
written (x, t). In the ﬁrst case, the read operation takes place before all write
operations of the history. In the second case, the latest write operation of the
history has written (x, t). This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Remarks. A veriﬁer who wants to apply Theorem CRIT to a given algorithm,
has only to invent a prescription for the writers’ choice of sqn and then to
verify the three assumptions of the theorem. When the veriﬁer is also the
designer of the algorithm, he or she can use the assumptions of the theorem
as guiding principles for the design.
The atomicity criterion Lemma 13.16 of [20] generates more compli-
cated proof obligations than Theorem CRIT. It is also more general in the
sense that it can be used to prove Theorem CRIT, but we do not describe that
proof since it is more difﬁcult than proving Theorem CRIT from scratch.
If writing occurs in the last atomic action of the write operation, masq is
always the highest number that can be read by a reader. In that case, masq
need not be updated in the ﬁnal actions of readers. Below, this applies to
Bloom’s algorithm but not to the algorithm of Vitanyi and Awerbuch.
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The proof of atomicity of the handshake register of Tromp [23] in [15]
and the snapshot algorithm of [20] 13.4.5 can also be cast in the present
setting.
It is not hard to prove that the type integer of the ghost variables start,
sqn, and masq can be replaced by an arbitrary type with a linear order. In
particular, one may use reals or lexically ordered strings.
3 Veriﬁcation of Bloom’s algorithm
In this Section, Theorem CRIT is used to prove atomicity of Bloom’s register,
cf. [3]. The problem solved by Bloom’s algorithm is to construct, i.e., to
simulate, an atomic register that can be modiﬁed by two writers and can be
read by n readers, given two atomic registers that can be modiﬁed by one
writer and can be read by n+ 1 readers.
Bloom solves this problem as follows. The twowriting ports, called writ-
ers, are numbered 0 and 1. Each writer (say q) has its own one-writer atomic
register Reg[q], which has one bit more than the register to be simulated.
This additional bit (d) is used to indicate which of the two registers contains
the current value (v) of the simulated register. We use vw for the value to be
written and a private variable vr for the value to be read. We use the name
self for the acting process. All ports have some additional private variables
(e.g. d, x). We use the operator ⊕ to denote addition modulo 2. The writers
and readers are given by the following code.
Write (vw) :
read (d, x) from Reg[1− self]
write (d⊕ self, vw) to Reg[self]
return Ack .
Read :
read (d0, x0) from Reg[0]
read (d1, x1) from Reg[1]
read (d, vr) from Reg[d0 ⊕ d1]
return vr .
The commandsWrite and Read are clearly wait-free since the code contains
no loops or blocking commands. Note that when a port reads a pair from a
register, it always uses only one component and ignores the other component
of the pair.
The expression d ⊕ self in the writers’ code is explained as follows.
Since d ⊕ (d ⊕ q) = (d ⊕ d) ⊕ q = q, we have that, if the processes do
not interfere, writer q establishes the postcondition q = d0 ⊕ d1 where d0,
d1 are the additional bits of the two registers. The readers use this property
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to determine which register to read. This shows that the object is at least
sequentially correct. Note that the initial values of the additional bits are
irrelevant for this.
If the processes do interfere, however, correctness is far from obvious.
We proceed with the analysis in the following way. In 3.1, we transform the
program to our notation, make some initial observations and establish the
ﬁrst invariant. In 3.2, we turn to the application of our atomicity criterion.We
introduce ghost variables in the program and express the proof obligations
in three invariants. Preservation of these invariants is proved by means of
some auxiliary invariants in 3.3.
3.1 Initial transformation
For the ease of notation, the registers Reg are split in registers dir for the
tag bits, and registers val for the values, according to the declarations
val : array bit of value ,
dir : array bit of bit ,
where bit = {0, 1}.
As is well known, actions on private variables can be combined atomi-
callywith actions on shared variables, cf. [2] Theorem6.26. Sincewewant to
verify the invariants mechanically, we introduce explicit program locations.
The locations are numbered from 20 or 30 for easy ﬁnding in the code for
the theorem prover. Each number stands for one atomic instruction. For the
ease of the veriﬁcation, we combine atomic commands whenever possible.
We need one private variable loc for both writers and readers. We thus
represent Bloom’s code as follows.
Write (vw) :
20 loc := dir[1− self]⊕ self ;
21 val[self] := vw ;
dir[self] := loc ;
22 goto 20 .
In action 20, the writer determines the value of the additional bit loc that
stands for the expression d ⊕ self in Bloom’s code. Action 21 represents
the write action to Reg[self] and is therefore regarded as a single atomic
command. The ﬁnal command is chosen to model that a writing port can
write again. Note that, when it does so, it may use a fresh value vw to write.
In our NQTHM modelling, vw is updated nondeterministically with the ﬁrst
component of oracle, see Sect. 1.5.
In order to show that the order of the ﬁrst two read actions of the readers
is irrelevant, we give each reader a private variable pr to indicate where to
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read ﬁrst. The value of pr is chosen nondeterministically, again by means
of oracle.
Read :
30 loc := dir[1− pr] ;
31 loc := loc⊕ dir[pr] ;
32 vr := val[loc] ;
33 choose pr in {0, 1} ;
goto 30 .
In order to give some feeling for the protocol, we start with a bottom-up
analysis. Recall that the value of a private variable x of process q is denoted
x.q. In particular, pc.q is the program location of process q.
We ﬁrst investigate what is read by a reader that performs the actions 30,
31, 32, when no writer has an interleaving action 21. In that case, the reader
reads the value at index loc = dir[0] ⊕ dir[1]. Anthropomorphically
speaking, such a fast reader acts as if dir[0] ⊕ dir[1] is the latest writer
of the register. We therefore deﬁne the state function LaWr by
LaWr = dir[0]⊕ dir[1] .
When a writer q = LaWr executes action 20, it establishes pc.q = 21 and
loc.q = dir[1− q]⊕ LaWr = dir[q]. It turns out that this property is an
invariant of the system:
(Bloom) q = LaWr ∧ pc.q = 21 ⇒ loc.q = dir[q] .
This is shown as follows. Apart from action 20 by q itself (as treated just
now), the only threat to predicate (Bloom) is when a port p = q executes 21
and thusmodiﬁesLaWr. It modiﬁesLaWr only if loc.p = dir[p]. Predicate
(Bloom) therefore implies that p = LaWr initially. Since pmodiﬁes LaWr,
it becomes itself equal to LaWr and then has pc.p = 22. This shows that,
indeed, (Bloom) is preserved.
Remark. It is not true that, conversely, q = LaWr and pc.q = 21 implies
loc.q = dir[q]. In fact, if q = LaWr and pc.q = 21, the other writer may
modify LaWr, but it cannot modify loc.q or dir[q].
3.2 The main analysis
We turn to the proof of the protocol. In view of Theorem CRIT, we give every
port a private ghost variable sqn to hold a number. We introduce a shared
ghost variable time and we let the sequence number of a writer be obtained
by the action
time ++ ; sqn := time ;
snlist := sqn : snlist .
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Here, we use the operator ++ for incrementation and : for adding an element
to a list. In the concluding write action 21, the sequence number is tagged
as a time stamp to the value written. For this purpose, we introduce a shared
ghost variable tag for the time stamps, according to the declaration
tag : array bit of integer .
We then extend action 21 with
tag[self] := sqn ;
masq := max(sqn,masq) .
We use the analysis of Sect. 3.1 to decide at which moment a writer gets
its sequence number. If writer LaWr executes 20 and the other writer then
modiﬁesLaWr by executing 21,wemust justify the behaviour of fast readers
by giving the second writer a later sequence number than the ﬁrst one.
We therefore give a writer its new sequence number at action 20 if it then
equals LaWr. Otherwise, the sequence number is obtained in action 21.
The question whether the writer equals LaWr can be encoded by the test
loc = dir[self] after the assignment to loc in 20. We thus get the following
extended code for the writers.
Write (vw) :
20 start := masq ;
loc := dir[1− self]⊕ self ;
if loc = dir[self] then
time ++ ; sqn := time ;
snlist := sqn : snlist ﬁ ;
21 if loc = dir[self] then
time ++ ; sqn := time ;
snlist := sqn : snlist ﬁ ;
val[self] := vw ;
dir[self] := loc ;
tag[self] := sqn ;
masq := max(sqn,masq) ;
22 goto 20 .
Since loc.q and dir[q] are modiﬁed only by writer q itself, every write
action obtains precisely one sequence number. Note the update of the ghost
variable masq according to the setting of Theorem CRIT.
When a reader starts reading, its private ghost variable start becomes a
copy of masq. When the reader executes 32, the private ghost variable sqn
records the time stamp of the value that is read. The program for the readers
therefore becomes
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Read :
30 start := masq ;
loc := dir[1− pr] ;
31 loc := loc⊕ dir[pr] ;
32 vr := val[loc] ; sqn := tag[loc] ;
masq := max(sqn,masq) ;
33 choose pr in {0, 1} ; goto 30 .
At this point one easily veriﬁes the setting of Theorem CRIT. In particular,
whenever a reader reads a pair (x, t) in instruction 32, there has been awriter
that wrote the same pair in instruction 21. This follows from the atomicity
of the instructions 21 and 32 and the observation that the arrays val and
tag are modiﬁed only in 21.
Remark. This atomicity might have been more apparent when we had rep-
resented the pair of arrays val, tag by an array of pairs. The present set-up
was chosen since tag is a ghost variable whereas val is an actual variable.
According to Theorem CRIT, it now sufﬁces to prove the invariants
(Iq0) pc.q = 22 ⇒ start.q < sqn.q ,
(Iq1) pc.q = 33 ⇒ start.q ≤ sqn.q ,
(Iq2) IsSet (snlist) ,
where predicate IsSet determines whether its argument is a list without mul-
tiple occurrences.
3.3 The veriﬁcation
In this subsection we prove that the predicates (Iq0), (Iq1), (Iq2) are in-
variants of the system. This requires the invention of a number of other
invariants. We can assume that all invariants hold as a precondition for each
atomic step and then have to prove that they hold in the postcondition. Often
this requires detailed case distinctions. The proof given below matches the
formal proof [16] that has been veriﬁed with the theorem prover NQTHM.
One may notice that, for a theorem prover, boring trivialities and subtle case
distinctions are not far apart.
The method used is as follows. We start with the invariants postulated,
here (Iq0), (Iq1), and (Iq2). For each invariant,we thenverifywhether eachof
the atomic commands preserves it.When some atomic commandmay falsify
it, we postulate some auxiliary invariants to hold in the precondition of that
atomic command that prevent this falsiﬁcation. These auxiliary invariants
should be as weak as possible. Indeed, they must hold initially, and we have
to maximize the likelyhood that they in turn are preserved by all atomic
actions. When the resulting list contains an invariant that is implied by other
invariants, such an invariant can be removed from the list.
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In this way, the invariants appear in an unsystematic order. For example,
looking ahead, one can see invariants (Jq3) and (Jq6),which canbe combined
to
q ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ tag[q] ≤ sqn.q ≤ time .
We separate such invariants since we need them at different points and since
the proof of invariance is easier when they are separated.
A predicate P is said to be threatened by a command A iff it is not true
that A started with precondition P always has postcondition P . If P is a
predicate threatened by a command A, we need more information than P
alone to prove its invariance, i.e., we have to postulate some other invariant
Q such thatA started with precondition P ∧Q always has postcondition P .
Since pc, start, and sqn are private variables, predicate (Iq0) is threatened
only when a writing port q executes 21. If it does so, it preserves (Iq0) if
and only if we also have the invariants
(Jq0) pc.q = 21 ∧ loc.q = dir[q] ⇒ start.q < sqn.q ,
(Kq0) pc.q = 21 ∧ loc.q = dir[q] ⇒ start.q ≤ time .
We ﬁrst note that (Kq0) is implied by postulating the slightly stronger in-
variants
(Jq1) pc.q ∈ {21, 31, 32} ⇒ start.q ≤ masq ;
(Jq2) masq ≤ time .
Predicate (Jq0) is threatened by command 20, but preserved because of
(Jq2). Since start is set to masq in 20 and 30 and masq is incremented
only, predicate (Jq1) is an invariant. Predicate (Jq2) is threatened only by
21 and 32. It is preserved at these points because of the obvious invariants
for writers
(Jq3) q ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ sqn.q ≤ time ;
(Jq4) q ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ tag[q] ≤ masq .
This concludes the proof of invariance of (Iq0).
Since pc, start, and sqn are private variables, predicate (Iq1) is threatened
only by action 32. It is preserved by 32 because of the new postulate
(Jq5) pc.q = 32 ⇒ start.q ≤ tag[loc.q] .
Predicate (Jq5) is threatened by 21 and 31. It is preserved when p executes
21 with loc.p = dir[p] because of (Jq1) and (Jq2). It is preserved by p at
21 with loc.p = dir[p] because of the new postulate
(Jq6) q ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ tag[q] ≤ sqn.q .
Predicate (Jq5) is preserved at 31 because of the new postulate
(Jq7) pc.q = 31 ⇒ start.q ≤ tag[loc.q ⊕ dir[pr.q]] .
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Since tag[q] and sqn.q are modiﬁed only by writer q, predicate (Jq6) is
threatened only by action 20. It is preserved because of (Jq2) and (Jq4).
Predicate (Jq7) is threatened only by the actions 21 and 30. Recall that
LaWr = dir[0] ⊕ dir[1]. Preservation of (Jq7) at 30 now follows from
the new invariant
(Jq8) masq = tag[LaWr] ,
which, as a justiﬁcation of the acronym LaWr, expresses that the time stamp
of LaWr is the highest time stamp.
Preservation of (Jq7) when writer p executes 21 is complicated, since
bothtag anddir can bemodiﬁed by 21. It is shown as follows. Ifdir is not
modiﬁed, i.e., if loc.p = dir[p], it sufﬁces to use (Jq6). If dir is modiﬁed,
let Y be the new value of loc.q ⊕ dir[pr.q]. If p = Y , preservation of
(Jq7) follows from (Jq1) and (Jq2). Otherwise, we use the invariant (Bloom)
veriﬁed in Sect. 3.1. This invariant implies that p = 1− LaWr. Therefore,
Y = LaWr and preservation of (Jq7) follows from (Jq1) and (Jq8).
Predicate (Jq8) is threatened only at 21 and 32. It is preserved at 32 since
(Jq4) implies that masq is not modiﬁed in 32. Preservation of (Jq8) when
a writer p executes 21 is shown as follows. If p = LaWr then (Bloom)
implies that loc.p = dir[p]. Therefore LaWr remains p and preservation
of (Jq8) follows from (Jq6). If p = LaWr and loc.p = dir[p], preservation
of (Jq8) follows from (Jq2). In the remaining case, with p = LaWr and
loc.p = dir[p], we use the new postulate that LaWr is the only writer that
can have sqn.q > masq:
(Jq9) q ∈ {0, 1} ∧ masq < sqn.q ⇒ q = LaWr .
Predicate (Jq9) seems to be threatened by the actions 20 and 21. If p executes
20 and increments sqn.p, it becomes LaWr, so that (Jq9) is preserved. If q
executes 21, it sets masq ≥ sqn.q. Finally, if p = q executes 21, it preserves
(Jq9) because of (Jq3) applied to q. This concludes the proof of invariance
of (Iq1).
The invariance of (Iq2) easily follows from the obvious invariant
(Jq10) x ∈ snlist ⇒ x ≤ time .
It remains to initialize the variables such that all invariants hold. For the
ghost variables time and masq, we take the initial values t0 = 1. For the
two writers, q, we specify initially pc.q = 20 and tag[q] = sqn.q = t0. For
the readers, it sufﬁces to specify that pc = 30 initially.
Remark. The initialization of sqn.q of the writers is needed because the
invariants (Jq3), (Jq6), and (Jq9) are stronger than necessary. A stricter
analysis shows that these inequalities are needed only when pc.q = 21 and
loc.q = dir[q].
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The above proof uses implicitly that 0 and 1 are the only writing ports.
Themechanical proofmakes this explicit by requiring the obvious additional
invariant
pc.q ∈ {20, 21, 22} ≡ q ∈ {0, 1} .
The mechanical proof also needs the type invariants that loc and pr are bits.
The mechanical proof bloom in [16] is an NQTHM events ﬁle, cf. [4,5].
The method employed is the same as used in [14, 15]. The ﬁle bloom is
the input to the theorem prover. It consists of around 1250 lines. After a
call of the prelude for concurrency that was mentioned in Sect. 1.5, the ﬁrst
part of this ﬁle (340 lines) contains the program and the analysis of how
the variables are modiﬁed in the atomic steps. The proofs of the individual
invariants require 630 lines. The remainder is taken by the proof that the
individual invariants combine to one global invariant (140 lines) and the
proof that the global invariant can be initialized (140 lines). This remainder
is an administrative check of global consistency.
4 The Vitanyi-Awerbuch algorithm
In this section, we use Theorem CRIT to prove the atomicity of the algorithm
of Vitanyi and Awerbuch [24], see also [20], Sect. 13.4.5.
This algorithm is an implementation of a read-write atomic object with
m ports that can both read and write. It usesm2 registers, each for a single
writer and a single reader. It is based on the declarations
type
Port = [0 . .m− 1] ;
Reg = record
val : Value ;
tag : Integer ;
end ;
var x : array Port,Port of Reg ;
Register x[p, q] is a variable that can be read only by port p and written only
by port q. All registers are initially equal to (v0, t0) where v0 is the initial
value of the abstract object and t0 is some initial number.
In this algorithm, the ﬁelds tag are actual variables that must be able to
hold arbitrary large integers. These ﬁelds serve to hold the tags used in our
atomicity criterion. The algorithm also uses private variables that play the
roles of the ghost variables sqn of the atomicity criterion. These variables
are therefore named sqn here.
The algorithm works as follows. A writing port that has to write a value
vw, ﬁrst reads all tags that it can read and then chooses a number sqn bigger
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than all of them. To ensure that different writers always choose different
numbers, the writer keeps sqn modm equal to its process identiﬁer self.
It subsequently writes the pair (vw, sqn) to all available registers. These
design decisions could have been inspired directly byTheoremCRIT.Though
Vitanyi and Awerbuch clearly did not need it, this is the guidance to the
designer that we suggested in the introduction.
Write (vw) :
num := 0 ;
for all j in Port do
num := max(num,x[self, j].tag) od ;
sqn := (num divm+ 1) ∗m+ self ;
for all i in Port do
x[i, self] := (vw, sqn) od ;
return Ack .
A reader reads the record with the highest number and also transfers that
record to all its writing registers. At this point, we cannot see this, but the
latter activity is needed so that the writing ports can obtain a good estimate
of the ghost variable masq of the atomicity criterion.
Read :
num := 0 ;
for all j in Port do
if num ≤ x[self, j].tag then
dat := x[self, j] ;
num := dat.tag ﬁ od ;
for all i in Port do
x[i, self] := dat od ;
return dat.val .
These implementations ofWrite and Read contains no blocking commands
or unbounded repetitions. They have a time complexity of order m, the
number of ports. Therefore, both writing and reading are wait-free.
As before, one easily veriﬁes the setting of Theorem CRIT. In particular,
whenever a reader reads a pair (v, t) in its ﬁrst for loop, it was the initial
value (v0, t0) or there has been a writer that wrote the pair (v, t) in its second
for loop.
4.1 Initial transformation
We turn to the veriﬁcation of the assumptions of Theorem CRIT. For conve-
nience, we represent the array x of pairs by a pair of arrays val and tag
in the obvious way. So, now, array tag is an actual variable, not a ghost
variable as in Sect. 3. Yet, its elements will ﬁgure as the tags of the atomicity
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criterion. The private variables sqn of the writing ports are also actual vari-
ables. Since we need invariants during the for loops, we introduce a private
variable lis for the set of port numbers that yet have to be treated in the loop.
Write (vw) :
20 start := masq ; num := 0 ; lis := Port ;
21 if IsEmpty(lis) then goto 22 else
choose j ∈ lis ; lis := lis \ {j} ;
num := max(num,tag[self, j]) ;
goto 21 ﬁ ;
22 sqn := (num divm+ 1) ∗m+ self ; lis := Port ;
23 if IsEmpty(lis) then goto 24 else
choose i ∈ lis ; lis := lis \ {i} ;
val[i, self] := vw ;
tag[i, self] := sqn ;
goto 23 ﬁ ;
24 snlist := sqn : snlist ;
masq := max(sqn,masq) ;
goto 20 or 30 .
The ﬁnal goto is chosen to model that, after writing or reading, a port may
decide to write or read again. In our NQTHM modelling, the choice between
20 and 30 is determined by the oracle as explained in 1.5. We could have
done the same for the choices of j and i from lis, but we did not regard
that as worth the effort. Indeed, looking at the proof below, one easily sees
that the order of treating the elements of lis is irrelevant. For the sake of
symmetry, the value dat determined by the reader is represented by the pair
of private variables (vr, sqn).
Read :
30 start := masq ; num := 0 ; lis := Port ;
31 if IsEmpty(lis) then goto 32 else
choose j ∈ lis ; lis := lis \ {j} ;
if num ≤ tag[self, j] then
vr := val[self, j] ;
num := tag[self, j] ﬁ ;
goto 31 ﬁ ;
32 lis := Port ; sqn := num ;
33 if IsEmpty(lis) then goto 34 else
choose i ∈ lis ; lis := lis \ {i} ;
val[i, self] := vr ;
tag[i, self] := sqn ;
goto 33 ﬁ ;
34 masq := max(sqn,masq) ;
goto 20 or 30 .
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It is easy to see that we have followed the prescriptions of Theorem CRIT
with respect to the assignments to start, sqn, masq, and snlist.
According to Theorem CRIT, it now sufﬁces to prove the invariants
(Lq0) pc.q ∈ {23, 24} ⇒ start.q < sqn.q ;
(Lq1) pc.q = 33 ⇒ start.q ≤ sqn.q
(Lq2) IsSet (snlist) .
We strengthened (Lq0) by including location 24 for the sake of later conve-
nience.
4.2 Veriﬁcation
We use the same method as for Bloom’s algorithm to verify preservation of
the invariants.
In view of the commands 22 and 32, preservation of (Lq0) and (Lq1)
follows when we also have the invariant
(Mq0) pc.q ∈ {22, 32} ⇒ start.q ≤ num.q .
In order to prove preservation of (Mq0) when q executes 21 or 31, we need
an invariant that incorporates the tags that are yet to be encountered in that
loop. Indeed, preservation of (Mq0) follows from the new invariant
(Mq1) pc.q ∈ {21, 31} ⇒ start.q ≤ max (num.q,
(MAX j ∈ lis.q :: tag[q, j])) .
It is easy to see that (Mq1) is preserved by the commands 21 and 31: it is a
kind of loop invariant. Predicate (Mq1) is threatened by the modiﬁcations
of start, num, lis in 20 and 30 and by the modiﬁcations of tag in 23 and
33. It is preserved by the former when we postulate the invariant
(Mq2) masq ≤ (MAX j ∈ Port :: tag[q, j]) .
It is preserved by the latter when the modiﬁcations of tag are always in-
crementations, as will follow from the invariant
(Nq0) pc.q ∈ {23, 33} ∧ i ∈ lis.q ⇒ tag[i, q] ≤ sqn.q .
This predicate follows from (Lq0) and (Lq1)whenwe postulate the invariant
(Mq3) pc.q ∈ {23, 33} ∧ i ∈ lis.q ⇒ tag[i, q] ≤ start.q .
Since tag[i, q] is modiﬁed only by port q, preservation of (Mq3) follows
from the invariant
(Mq4) pc.q ∈ {21, 22, 31, 32} ⇒ tag[i, q] ≤ start.q .
Preservation of (Mq4) follows from the invariant
(Mq5) pc.q ∈ {20, 30} ⇒ tag[i, q] ≤ masq .
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Preservation of (Mq5) in its turn follows from the invariant
(Mq6) pc.q ∈ {24, 34} ⇒ tag[i, q] = sqn.q .
Finally, preservation of (Mq6) follows from the obvious invariant
(Mq7) pc.q ∈ {23, 33} ∧ i /∈ lis.q ⇒ tag[i, q] = sqn.q .
It remains to prove preservation of (Mq2). This predicate is threatened by
the assignments tomasq andtag. It is preservedwhen port p executes 24 or
34 since sqn.p = tag[q, p] holds by (Mq6). It is preserved by assignments
to tag because of (Nq0).
We turn to the invariant (Lq2) that expresses the uniqueness of the se-
quence numbers. Here we use that each writing port q only uses sqn with
sqn.q modm = q, as expressed in the obvious invariant
(Mq8) pc.q ∈ {23, 24} ⇒ sqn.q modm = q .
In order to prove preservation of (Lq2), it sufﬁces to prove the predicate
(Nq1) pc.q = 24 ⇒ sqn.q /∈ snlist .
In order to prove (Nq1), we introduce the set
SN(q) = {x ∈ snlist |xmodm = q}
and postulate that start.q is an upper bound of SN(q):
(Mq9) x ∈ SN(q) ∧ pc.q ∈ {21, 22, 23, 24} ⇒ x ≤ start.q .
Predicate (Nq1) is implied by (Mq8), (Mq9), and (Lq0) as is shown in
pc.q = 24 ∧ sqn.q ∈ snlist
⇒ {(Mq8)}
pc.q = 24 ∧ sqn.q ∈ SN(q)
⇒ {(Mq9)}
pc.q = 24 ∧ sqn.q ≤ start.q
⇒ {(Lq0) }
false .
It is here that we use that (Lq0) has been strengthened to cover location 24.
The set SN(q) is modiﬁed only when port q itself executes command
24, but then pc.q becomes 20 or 30. Predicate (Mq9) is therefore threatened
only when port q itself executes 20 and thus gets pc.q = 21. At that point,
preservation of (Mq9) follows from the obvious invariant that masq is an
upper bound of snlist:
(Mq10) x ∈ snlist ⇒ x ≤ masq .
It is easy to see that the invariants can be initialized.
This concludes the veriﬁcation of the assumptions of Theorem CRIT for
the Vitanyi-Awerbuch algorithm and thus proves that the algorithm imple-
ments an atomic read-write register.
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The mechanical proof vitanyi we constructed for this algorithm can
be obtained from [16]. The proofs of the invariants are somewhat easier
than in bloom, but the events ﬁle is longer (1482 lines) since it requires
arithmetic for command 22 and a quantiﬁcation in invariant (Mq1).Wewere
able to mechanize our handwritten proof in less than two days since it was
almost ﬂawless and we had the arithmetic for command 22 available. The
one ﬂaw in our handwritten proof was an insufﬁcient candidate for (Mq10).
5 Concluding remarks
We presented and proved an assertional criterion for atomicity of read-write
objects (Theorem CRIT). This criterion enabled us to prove the correctness
of Bloom’s algorithm for two writers and of the algorithm of Vitanyi and
Awerbuch for a bounded number of readers and writers. The proofs are
simple enough for straightforward veriﬁcation with a mechanical theorem
prover.
It seems likely that our criterion is strictly weaker than the behavioural
criterion Lemma 13.16 of [20].We believe, however, that it is strong enough
for every atomic read-write object that is not speciﬁcally designed to be hard
to prove.
The proof for Bloom’s algorithm is based on the new (but natural) idea
to order the write operations as perceived by fast readers and to encode
this order by actions on ghost variables. The key to this was the invariant
(Bloom), the only invariant for Bloom’s algorithm that mentions no ghost
variables. In Bloom’s proof [3] the order of writing is not deﬁned by fast
readers but by the actual inﬁnite execution. Thismayhave been the reason for
Groote to suggest in [10] to phrase the proof in terms of prophecy variables
(see [1]).
The criterionwas evenmore useful in the case of the algorithm ofVitanyi
and Awerbuch. For, in this case, the sequence numbers could be found as
actual variables of the algorithm.With our system, we always have to invent
the invariants, but in this case thatwas easy.Conversely, aswehave indicated,
our criterion could have suggested the design of this algorithm.
It is a fairly straightforward exercise to apply the criterion to prove atom-
icity of the snapshot algorithm of [20] 13.4.5 or of Tromp’s handshake reg-
ister [15, 23].
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